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A TRUCE IN CRIMINAL LAW’S DISTRIBUTIVE
PRINCIPLE WARS?
Paul H. Robinson*

Crime-control utilitarians and retributivist philosophers have long been at war
over the appropriate distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, with little apparent possibility of reconciliation between the two. In the
utilitarians’ view, the imposition of punishment can be justiﬁed only by the
practical beneﬁt that it provides: avoiding future crime. In the retributivists’
view, doing justice for past wrongs is a value in itself that requires no further
justiﬁcation. The competing approaches simply use different currencies: ﬁghting
future crime versus doing justice for past wrongs.
It is argued here that the two are in fact reconcilable, in a fashion. We
cannot declare a winner in the distributive principle wars but something more
like a truce. Speciﬁcally, good utilitarians ought to support a distributive
principle based upon desert because the empirical evidence suggests that doing
justice for past wrongdoing is likely the most effective and efﬁcient means of
controlling future crime. A criminal justice system perceived by the community
as conﬂicting with its principles of justice provokes resistance and subversion,
whereas a criminal justice system that earns a reputation for reliably doing
justice is one whose moral credibility inspires deference, assistance, and acquiescence, and is more likely to have citizens internalize its norms of what is truly
condemnable conduct.
Retributivists ought to support empirical desert as a distributive principle
because, while it is indeed distinct from deontological desert, there exists an
enormous overlap between the two, and it seems likely that empirical desert
may be the best practical approximation of deontological desert. Indeed, some
philosophers would argue that the two are necessarily the same.
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INTRODUCTION

Since a century before any of us were born, criminal law theory has been
torn between two apparently irreconcilable distributive principles. Utilitarian principles like deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous saw
preventing crime as their primary goal. So-called “retributivist” principles, in contrast, set doing justice as their goal. In this view, doing
justice—imposing liability and punishment according to each offender’s
blameworthiness, his desert—was a value in itself that required no further
justiﬁcation.
There seemed little possibility of reconciliation between the two competing principles. In the utilitarians’ view, the imposition of punishment can be
justiﬁed only by the practical beneﬁt that it provides: avoiding future crime.
In the retributivists’ view, doing justice for past wrongs is a value in itself that
requires no further justiﬁcation. The competing approaches simply give
value to different things. They use different currencies: ﬁghting future crime
versus doing justice for past wrongs.
It is argued here is that the two are in fact reconcilable, in a fashion. I’m
not suggesting that we declare a winner in the distributive principle wars
but something more like a truce. Speciﬁcally, good utilitarians ought to
support a distributive principle based upon desert, because the empirical
evidence suggests that doing justice for past wrongdoing is probably the
most effective and efﬁcient means of controlling future crime.1
But “doing justice” here is not justice in the deontological desert sense
of what moral philosophers think is deserved, but rather justice in the
“empirical desert” sense, as it is called, that reﬂects the community’s
shared judgments of justice. The empirical research shows that people’s
assessment of an offender’s overall blameworthiness takes into account
a wide variety of factors, including the seriousness of the offense, the
culpable state of mind of the offender (intentional, reckless, or negligent),
and the offender’s mental, emotional, and physical capacities at the time
1. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013), Part II, 96–238.

DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE WARS?

|

the offense.2 Speciﬁcally, it is argued that by tracking the community’s
principles of justice the system can build “moral credibility” with the community, which allows it to harness the powerful forces of social inﬂuence,
community support, and internalized norms.
Recent empirical research conﬁrms that a criminal justice system perceived by the community as conﬂicting with their principles of justice is
one that provokes resistance and subversion, but a criminal justice system
that earns a reputation for reliably doing justice—by tracking shared
community judgments of justice—is one whose moral credibility
inspires greater deference, assistance, and acquiescence, and is more likely
to have citizens internalize its norms of what constitutes truly condemnable conduct.
The most efﬁcient way of sketching the main arguments and giving
some examples of empirical support may be to address ﬁve issues that
people could reasonably ask about using empirical desert—the community’s shared principles of justice—as the primary distributive principle for
criminal liability and punishment:
1. Is there any such thing as the community’s views of justice?
2. Aren’t the community’s views of justice brutish and draconian?
3. Why should a crime-control utilitarian care what the community
thinks is just? Why would an empirical desert distributive principle
reduce crime?
4. Even if empirical desert can have some crime reduction effect,
wouldn’t distributive principles of general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous have even more?
5. Should the criminal law ever deviate from the community’s
shared principles of justice? If not, aren’t we stuck with the
status quo, which social reformers might have good reasons to
want to change?

1. I S

THERE ANY SUCH THING AS THE COMMUNITY ’ S VIEWS OF JUSTICE ?

Perhaps justice is such a complex judgment that everybody has their own
personal view? Perhaps there is no community view, and thus no ability to

2. See generally id., Part III, 239–413.
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Figure 1. Six face drawings. Source: Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 31
(see n. 1).

construct a criminal law that reﬂects the community’s views of justice? The
empirical evidence, however, suggests otherwise.3
Especially for issues that one might call the “core of wrongdoing”—
physical injury to others, taking property without consent, and deceit
in exchanges—there is in fact high agreement across all demographics.
Consider one study that had subjects rank order 24 scenarios according
to overall blameworthiness, deserved punishment. The results showed
a Kendall’s W of 0.95 for in-person subjects and 0.88 for Internet
subjects—an astounding result.
One can’t normally get this level of agreement except in observational
studies, as with asking subjects to judge the relative brightness of dot
clusters. Where subjects are asked for something beyond the purely observational, the analytic task requested of them must be almost intuitional.
For example, one can get a similarly high Kendall’s W by asking subjects to
rank order the standard pain images used for medical diagnosis with nonverbal patients presented in Figure 1.
The empirical studies also suggest that even uneducated people have
very sophisticated and nuanced judgments about justice. Small changes in
facts produce predictable changes in blameworthiness judgments.4
People’s judgments don’t tie a particular punishment to a particular level
of blameworthiness. However, because ordinary people can distinguish so
many cases along the blameworthiness continuum, and because the punishment continuum contains a ﬁnite number of points (meaningful differences require larger units as the length of imprisonment gets longer),
people’s judgments about the relative blameworthiness of a particular case
against all other cases end up at a particular point on the punishment
3. See id., 18–34.
4. See id., Part III for a wide range of such studies.
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continuum, not because there is some magical connection between that
amount of punishment and that blameworthiness, but rather because it is
that single point that puts the case in its proper ordinal rank with all other
cases. If the endpoint of the punishment continuum changes, so too will
the punishment location of each case on continuum.
The endpoint of the punishment continuum is not something on which
people’s judgments are ﬁxed. We see signiﬁcant endpoint differences
among different societies, which conﬁrms how malleable the endpoint
judgment is. Judgments of relative blameworthiness, in contrast, especially
concerning the core wrongdoing, are not so malleable. This is conﬁrmed by
the fact that we ﬁnd the same rank ordering of crime scenarios across
demographics and cultures.5
This high level of agreement on relative blameworthiness within the core
of wrongdoing is not a surprise when one considers that people’s judgments of justice are in some signiﬁcant part a feature of human evolutionary development.6 And this is consistent with evidence suggesting that
many justice judgments are in large part intuitional, rather than the product of conscious reasoning.7 Danny Kahneman has famously distinguished
intuitional judgments as having attributes somewhere between pure perception and reasoned judgment, as seen in Figure 2.
As one moves out from the core of wrongdoing, disagreements among
people do appear. Downloading music from the Internet without a license
can be seen as analogous to traditional theft but is not itself a physical
taking without consent. Thus, while there may be strong agreement on
issues relating to the core of physical taking, there will be disagreement on
the downloading issue depending upon the extent to which a person has
accepted the analogy between unlicensed downloading and physical taking.
Whenever the intuitional justice judgment is supplemented by some
reasoned gloss, disagreements will appear. But the point is that, contrary to
the common wisdom of a decade ago, justice judgments are not something
about which everybody disagrees about everything. There is a strong core
of agreement. And to the extent that there is disagreement, we have the
methodology to reliably determine the center of the bell curve on any
criminal liability or punishment issue.
5. See id., 18–34.
6. See id., 35–62.
7. See id., 5–17.
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Figure 2. Process and content in two cognitive systems. Source: Daniel
Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgement and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality,” American Psychologist 58, no. 9 (Sept.
2003): 687, 698.
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That is, it is indeed possible to construct a criminal law that best approximates the community’s view.
2. A REN ’ T

THE COMMUNITY ’ S VIEWS OF JUSTICE BRUTISH AND DRACONIAN ?

Just because we can reliably determine the community view, it doesn’t
follow that we would want to follow that view in setting criminal liability
and punishment rules. Certainly many American academics are horriﬁed at
such a prospect because they see a series of policies in current criminal law
that they ﬁnd to be highly objectionable—policies that do injustice, not
justice, as they see it.
In Table 1, the fourth column lists a variety of common American
criminal law doctrines that progressive academics frequently criticize as
unjust. Each row of the table represents one of 12 real-world cases that
illustrate the operation of one of these crime-control doctrines. (These are
referred to as “crime-control doctrines” because they are justiﬁed by and
have been adopted upon crime-control grounds rather than upon a claim
that they produce carefully modulated deserved punishment.)
But what the research reveals is that these common liability and punishment rules clearly do not reﬂect community views. Just the opposite;
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Table 1. “Crime-control” scenarios.
Actual
Crime-Control Court
Doctrine
Sentence

Case
Name

Offense

L. Accidental
teacher shooting

Brazill

Murder

Adult
Prosecution
of Juveniles

28 years
w/o parole

K. Drowning
children to save
them from hell

Yates

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity
Defense

life

J. Accomplice
killing during
burglary

Moore

Felony murder, burglary

Felony Murder life at hard
labor w/o
parole

I. Killing officer
Clark
believed to be alien

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity
Defense

H. Cocaine
overdose

Felony murder, unlawful Felony Murder 40 years
distribution of controlled
substance

Scenario

Heacock

life

G. Cocaine in trunk Harmelin

Complicity in unlawful
Drug Offense life w/o
distribution of controlled Penalties
parole
substance

F. Air conditioner
fraud

Petty fraud

Three Strikes

life

E. Sex with female Haas
reasonably believed
overage

Statutory rape

Strict Liability

40 to 60
years

D. Underage sex by Garnett
mentally retarded
man

Statutory rape

Strict Liability

5 years

C. Marijuana
unloading

Papa

Unlawful possession of
controlled substance

Drug Offense 8 years
Penalties

B. Shooting of TV

Almond

Unlawfully discharging
firearm

Three Strikes

15 years
w/o parole

A. Incorrect lobster
container

Blandford Violation of
importation regulations

Criminalizing
Regulatory
Violations

15 years to
life

Rummel

Source: Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 123 (see n. 1).
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they dramatically conﬂict with them.8 They may well be consistent with
crime-control strategies of general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous, but they have the effect of disconnecting criminal punishment from
community notions of justice. Table 2 shows the community judgments on
the relative blameworthiness and appropriate punishment for each of the
cases contained in the previous table.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 2, the twelve crime-control cases with the
draconian sentences are shown indented and in italics (A through L). The
twelve cases in bold (1 through 12) are what might be called “milestone”
cases—crime scenarios ranging from the most minor to the most serious
that taken together provide a continuum of blameworthiness against which
the test crime-control cases can be compared. In the study, subjects were
asked to rank order all twenty-four of the cases, the twelve milestone cases
(1–12) and the twelve crime-control cases (A–L). The result is the order of
cases that you see in the table.
The important point here is that the crime-control cases that have the
draconian penalties in law, are in fact perceived by the subjects as being
dramatically less serious and blameworthy than the law treats them. For
example, Case F (Rummel, air-conditioner fraud), involving a minor fraud
by an offender who had been convicted for a series of previous such minor
frauds, was seen by the subjects as somewhat more serious than stealing
a microwave from a house and somewhat less serious than a minor assault
at a record store, offenses for which the subjects gave a sentence of 2.3 years
and 3.9 years, respectively, as compared to the life sentence that Rummel
actually got.
Note that the crime-control cases here are not cases of some renegade prosecutor or rogue judge, but rather are cases where the crimecontrol doctrine is being lawfully applied as designed. The Rummel case
went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the conviction and sentence were
afﬁrmed.
Figure 3 visually displays the dramatic nature of the law–community
conﬂict revealed in the previous table. Take, for example, Case F (the
Rummel case) on the right-hand margin. The solid line to the center
indicates where on the punishment continuum the subjects place this case,
close to the three-years mark. The dashed sloping line indicates the punishment that was actually imposed, life imprisonment.
8. See id., 110–40.
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Table 2. Subjects’ mean sentences for scenarios compared to actual sentences.

Scenario

Subjects’
Mean
Sentence

12. Ambush shooting

between life
and death

11. Stabbing

essentially life

10. Accidental mauling by pit bulls

20.6 years

L. Accidental teacher shooting (juvenile)

19.2 years

Actual Court
Sentence

28 years w/o parole

K. Drowning children to save them from hell 26.3 years
(insanity)

life

J. Accomplice killing during burglary (felony 17.7 years
murder)

life at hard labor w/
o parole

9. Clubbing during robbery

12.0 years

8. Attempted robbery at gas station

9.1 years

I. Killing officer believed to be alien (insanity) 16.5 years

life

H. Cocaine overdose (felony murder)

40 years

10.7 years

7. Stitches after soccer game

5.0 years

6.Slap & bruising at record store

3.9 years

G. Cocaine in trunk (drugs)

4.2 years

life w/o parole

F. Air conditioner fraud (3 strikes)

3.1 years

life w/o parole

5. Microwave from house
E. Sex with female reasonably believed
overage (strict liability)
4. Clock radio from car

2.3 years
2.9 years

40 to 60 years

1.9 years

D. Underage sex by mentally retarded man
(strict liability)

2.3 years

5 years

C. Marijuana unloading (drugs)

1.9 years

8 years

B. Shooting of TV (3 strikes)

1.1 years

15 years w/o parole

3. Whole pies from buffet
A. Incorrect lobster container (regulatory)

8.3 months
9.7 months

2. Wolf hallucination

1.1 years

1. Umbrella mistake

1.8 months

Source: Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 126 (see n. 1).

15 years to life
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Figure 3. Comparison of subjects’ and the law’s sentences for “crimecontrol” cases. Source: Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 127
(see n. 1).

The important point here is to see on the right-hand side the dramatic
difference between the solid lines and the corresponding dashed lines
for the same case. The enormity of the law–community conﬂict is
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emphasized by the fact that the punishment scale in this graphic is
exponential, not linear. Each one of the large dots, 1 through 8, represents
typically a doubling of punishment—the standard structure of criminal
code offense grade categories in the United States. Thus, if the difference
between the solid line and the dashed line for any case were only the
difference between 4 and 5 on the punishment scale, that small difference
on the scale means that the person is getting twice the punishment that
the subjects thought was deserved. In fact, community–law differences
are all dramatically more than that.
How could such a conﬂict occur in a democracy? It is not the draconian justice judgments of ordinary people that are producing these doctrines, but rather politicians’ reliance on coercive crime-control theories
like general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous—crimecontrol theories developed and pressed in the past by academics.9 Having
criminal liability and punishment rules track community views could be
an effective way of short-circuiting those injustice-producing doctrines.

3. W HY

SHOULD A CRIME - CONTROL UTILITARIAN CARE WHAT THE COMMUNITY

THINKS IS JUST ?

W HY

WOULD AN EMPIRICAL DESERT DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLE

REDUCE CRIME ?

The past ﬁfty years in the United States have seen reformers sufﬁciently
concerned about crime-control that they have been happy to sacriﬁce
justice in order to attempt to avoid future crime. This has brought greater
reliance upon the utilitarian crime-control distributive principles, primarily
those of general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous, despite
their conﬂict with deserved punishment.
But the empirical research suggests that the use of criminal liability and
punishment rules that conﬂict with the community’s principles of justice
may be self-defeating.
Setting aside the accumulating evidence that general deterrence may
work in principle but not in practice,10 recent research suggests that
crime-control effectiveness depends in some signiﬁcant part upon the
9. See Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law: Who Should Be
Punished How Much? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), chs. 3–6.
10. Id., 21–98. For a discussion on the difﬁculties with using incapacitation of the
dangerous as a distributive principle, see Robinson, Distributive Principles, 109–34 (see n. 9).
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criminal law’s moral credibility with the community. A criminal justice
system with a good reputation for reliably doing justice and avoiding
injustice is one that will inspire cooperation, support, deference, and the
internalization of its norms. In contrast, a criminal justice system that earns
a reputation for deviating from the community’s principles of justice—
deviating, that is, from “empirical desert”—is a system that will inspire
resistance and subversion, and will lose the ability to harness the powerful
forces of social inﬂuence and internalized norms.11
It is easy to see this principle at work on a large scale anecdotally.
The discredited Soviet criminal justice system gained compliance only
through an overwhelming and ever-present police state. The worse its
reputation for reliably doing justice, the less the deference it earned
from its citizens.
But more recent research suggests that the relationship between moral
credibility and community deference and compliance is much more widespread and nuanced. Even small incremental losses in moral credibility can
produce corresponding incremental losses in deference and compliance.
Figure 4 presents the results of a study, using a within-subjects design, in
which subjects were asked a number of questions relating to various ways in
which moral credibility is thought to affect deference, compliance, and the
internalization of the law’s norms. Will citizens assist police by reporting
crimes? Will they assist in the investigation and prosecution of crimes? Do
people take the imposition of criminal liability and punishment as a reliable
sign that the defendant has done something truly condemnable? Do people
take the extent of the liability imposed as a reliable indication of the
seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the offender?
With a baseline established, the subjects were then disillusioned by
exposing them to accounts of the system’s failures of justice and doing
of injustice. Finally, later retesting showed that the measures of deference,
compliance, and internalization of norms had all decreased.
A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different levels
of disillusionment to three different groups, and then testing their levels of
deference, compliance, and internalization. Table 3 reports the results,
which conﬁrm the conclusions of the earlier within-subjects design. The
greater the disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance,
and internalization.
11. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 141–207 (see n. 1).
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Figure 4. Pre- and post-stimulation averages. Source: Robinson,
Intuitions of Justice, 180 (see n. 1).
Question
1. Life sentence means offense conduct must be heinous
2. Law prohibition means posting false comments must
be condemnable
3. High sentence for financial maneuver means
condemnable
4. Report removel of arrowhead
5. Give found hand gun to police
6. Report dog violation to authorities
7. Go back and report your mistake to gas station
8. Go back and report your mistake to restaurant

PostBaseline stimulation
average
average
Significance
6.46
5.14
p < .001
6.14
5.76
p < .07
5.25

4.63

p < .02

5.93
6.66
5.15
7.05
7.15

5.14
5.56
4.59
5.69
5.71

p < .01
p < .001
p < .01
p < .001
p < .001

8
Baseline average
Post-stimulation average

7

Agreement

6

5

4

3
1. Life sentence 2. Social media

3. Financial
maneuver

4. Arrowhead

5. Hand gun

6. Dog lover

7. Gas station

8. Restaurant

The results in the two experimental studies are particularly striking
because subjects came to the study with pre-existing views on the system’s
reputation for being just. The experimenters, within the context of the
study, could only nudge those pre-existing views slightly. Yet, even that
incremental disillusionment produced corresponding reductions in deference and compliance.
This is important because it means that no matter what the current
state of a criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community,
any incremental reduction in credibility can produce an incremental
reduction in deference—and any increase can produce an increase in
deference.
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Table 3. Baseline, low, and high disillusionment averages. Where two cells on
a row do not share the same letter, they are statistically different.
Study 2a, baseline. Study 2b. Low Study 2c. High
No disillusionment disillusionment disillusionment

Item

1. Life sentence means heinous

6.46 [a]

6.59 [a]

5.35 [b]

2. Posting condemnable

6.14 [a]

5.38 [b]

5.59 [b]

3. Financial move condemnable

5.25 [a]

5.16 [a]

4.34 [b]

4. Report arrowhead

5.93 [a]

5.65 [a]

4.95 [b]

5. Turn in hand gun

6.66 [a]

5.40 [b]

4.32 [c]

6. Report dog violation

5.15 [a]

4.75 [a, b]

4.43 [b]

7. Return to gas station

7.05 [a]

6.63 [a]

5.63 [b]

8. Return to restaurant

7.15 [a]

6.47 [b]

5.84 [c]

Source: Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 182 (see n. 1).

4. E VEN

IF EMPIRICAL DESERT CAN HAVE SOME CRIME - REDUCTION

EFFECT , WOULDN ’ T DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL DETERRENCE
OR INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS HAVE EVEN MORE ?

Part of the attraction of empirical desert as a distributive principle comes
from the weaknesses of general deterrence, incapacitation the dangerous,
and other alternative principles. I have written a good deal on the subject,12
but let me quickly sketch the nature of my criticisms.
General deterrence can be an effective crime-control mechanism in
principle, but rarely in practice. Having a criminal justice system that
imposes punishment on wrongdoers certainly has a general deterrent
effect. Less clear, however, is the effectiveness of general deterrence as
the distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment—that is,
setting liability and punishment rules so as to maximize efﬁcient general
deterrent effect.
For a rule formulation to enhance general deterrence, it must meet at
least three prerequisites. First, the intended audience must know of the
rule. Second, the intended audience must be rational calculators who can
and will behave in a way that promotes their self-interest in light of the rule.

12. See Robinson, Distributive Principles, 21–98, 141–207 (see n. 9).
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And, third, their cost-beneﬁt analysis under the rule must suggest that the
costs of the contemplated violation outweigh its beneﬁts.
Unfortunately, rarely do these prerequisites exist in the real world.
First, the empirical research suggests that the target audience rarely knows
the law. Even when they think they know, they typically have it wrong.13
Academics and politicians spend a good deal of time agonizing over the
adoption and formulation of utilitarian crime-control doctrines, such as
a felony-murder rule, the three-strikes rule, the use of strict liability, and
the other crime-control doctrines listed in the fourth column of Table 1.
But if one asks people on the street, or even offenders in particular,
whether their jurisdiction adopts such a rule and, if so, which formulation
of the rule it has adopted, people will not know or, if they think they
know, will have the answer wrong. Instead, the research suggests that
people generally assume the criminal law rules are as they think they
should be: formulated to give deserved punishment based upon an offender’s overall blameworthiness.
Second, even if the target audience did know the legal rules, available
research suggests that the target audience is more often than not anything
but rational calculators. Instead, their decisions are heavily inﬂuenced by
mental or emotional disturbance; drug use or addiction; group inﬂuence,
especially by gangs; impulsiveness; and/or an indifference or inattentiveness
to consequences.
Finally, even if the target audience did know the legal rules and were
rational calculators, a general deterrent effect is possible only if the rational
calculations suggest that the costs of the wrongdoing outweigh the beneﬁts.
Yet, the capture and punishment rate for most offenses is so low—commonly less than 100 to 1 for offenses other than homicide—that the target
audience frequently sees the beneﬁts as outweighing the costs. More
importantly, the result of the calculation depends not on the reality of the
situation but rather on the potential offender’s perception of it. Thus,
when the empirical evidence suggests that many if not most potential
offenders generally overestimate their ability to avoid detection and punishment, the general deterrence project can have limited effect even if it
dramatically improves its punishment rates.

13. This is a particular problem in the United States, where there are 51 American
criminal codes.
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What makes a general deterrence distributive principle even less attractive is the fact that there is a general deterrent effect inherent in a desert
distribution of punishment. The only way that a general deterrence distribution of punishment can provide more deterrent effect than that inherent
in a desert distribution is by deviating from desert—in other words, by
doing injustice.
Yet, it is these instances of deviations from desert in which a general
deterrence distribution has its worst performance. As noted previously,
people assume the criminal law follows a desert distribution. Thus, it takes
a special educational campaign to make the target audience aware of a rule
based upon a general deterrence distribution that deviates from desert. The
evidence suggests that such special education is extremely difﬁcult, especially for the target audience of potential offenders.
Incapacitation of the dangerous is as problematic as a distributive principle of general deterrence, but for different reasons. Unlike general deterrence,
which has real difﬁculty producing greater deterrence than that already
inherent in a desert distribution, incapacitation does in fact work. Putting
people in prison does prevent further victimization of the community.
But the problem with the incapacitation distributive principle is that
behavioral scientists are at present relatively poor in reliably predicting
future criminality in a speciﬁc individual. False positive rates are very high,
which creates enormous costs and many intrusions on personal liberties
with no crime-control beneﬁt. The incapacitation distributive principle is
particularly disadvantaged in the United States, where constitutional limitations imposed by courts limit the open use of such preventive detention
and require instead that it be cloaked in criminal justice terms. Thus, for
example, instead of being able to openly evaluate an offender’s predicted
future dangerousness in setting a criminal sentence, liability and sentencing
rules commonly use substitutes like prior criminal record, which have
turned out to be even worse approximations of future dangerousness.
Finally, even if there were a situation where such coercive crime-control
principles as general deterrence or incapacitation could provide a crimecontrol beneﬁt by deviating from desert, any such advantage is likely to be
wiped out by the loss of crime-control effectiveness that comes when such
deviations from desert undercut the criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community.
Good reputations, as social psychologists make clear, are hard to build
and easy to destroy. A continuous stream of cases that deviate from
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deserved punishment in order to promote general deterrence or incapacitation is just the sort of thing that can seriously undermine the criminal
law’s moral credibility and thereby undermine its ability to harness the
powerful forces of social inﬂuence and internalized norms.

5. S HOULD

THE CRIMINAL LAW EVER DEVIATE FROM THE COMMUNITY ’ S

SHARED PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE ?

IF

NOT , AREN ’ T WE STUCK WITH THE

STATUS QUO , WHICH SOCIAL REFORMERS MIGHT HAVE GOOD REASONS
TO WANT TO CHANGE ?

One reason to worry about having criminal law rely upon community
views is that such a system may tend to impede social change—or, more
accurately, impede the use of law to bring about social change. Relying
upon community views presumably means relying upon people’s current
community views.
We know from history that existing community views are not
always the best for society. Changing those views can sometimes bring
a better world. And criminal law can sometimes be useful in helping to
change views. Consider, for example, the recent decriminalization of
same-sex intercourse and increased criminalization of domestic violence
and date rape.
However, the problem is that if criminal law gets out in front of community views, the disparity between the two can potentially lead to undermining criminal law’s moral credibility. This could be particularly tragic,
not just for effective crime control but also for social reform, for the greater
the moral credibility of the criminal law, the greater the law’s power to help
shift community views.
Does reliance upon an empirical desert distributive principle condemn
society to live with existing views forever? Not necessarily. As the criminal
law improves its moral credibility with the community—as it “earns moral
credibility chips” with the community—it can selectively “spend” those
chips by having criminal law lead rather than follow on selected issues of
special importance to social reformers.14
In other words, reliance upon an empirical desert distributive principle
might be an enormous help to social reformers because it creates a powerful
14. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice, 70–95, 189–207 (see n. 1).
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mechanism for changing social norms—a mechanism that did not previously exist when moral credibility was low.
However, social reformers will want to follow some particular strategies.
Spending the criminal law’s earned moral credibility chips to help change
societal norms has to be done carefully. If community views do in fact shift
as reformers want, then the conﬂict with the law disappears and there is no
long-term credibility damage. On the other hand, as we saw in the American Prohibition movement of the 1920s, if the law gets too far out in front
of community views and does not successfully shift community views, then
the law will lose moral credibility and that will translate into reduced crimecontrol effectiveness. In fact, crime rates during Prohibition went up, and
not just for alcohol-related offenses but rather for a wide range of offenses
unrelated to alcohol—which is exactly what one would expect when the
criminal law’s credibility has been undermined by showing itself to be
continually imposing punishment that conﬂicts with the community’s
justice judgments. People become habituated to lawbreaking. Perhaps
worse, pushing too far ahead without successfully shifting views can undermine the laws reputation in such a way as to reduce law’s usefulness to
social reformers in the future.

CONCLUSION

Neither the crime-control utilitarians nor the desert retributivists can claim
“victory” in the distributive principle wars. For the crime-control utilitarians, it makes good sense to adopt empirical desert as the dominant distributive principle, even though it would substitute for the classic
utilitarian crime-control theories, such as general deterrence and incapacitation the dangerous. The good utilitarian will follow the numbers, even
though it may seem to take them dangerously close to a desert distribution.
On the other hand, neither can the retributivists claim victory because
the desert distribution being relied upon is not that of the deontological
desert produced by moral philosophers. Instead, it is the empirical desert
distribution produced by social psychologists’ study of ordinary people and
is justiﬁed by its crime-control effectiveness rather than by a transcendent
notion of just desert as a value in itself. The retributivists can take some
comfort, however, in the fact that an empirical desert distribution is probably the best practical approximation of deontological desert that could be
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produced to guide the formulation of criminal law. Moral philosophers
disagree among themselves on many (if not most) key issues, and for
criminal code drafters there is no reliable mechanism for determining
which philosophical camp ought to be followed. In other words, there is
no practical possibility of adopting deontological desert as a distributive
principle, which is what the retributivists seek. They should be well satisﬁed, however, with empirical desert as its best practical approximation.15
Thus, although there is no victor in the distributive principle wars,
empirical desert as a distributive principle represents the basis for a truce
that both parties ought to feel comfortable with as the best practical means
of achieving their goals.

15. See Robinson, Distributive Principles, 175–212, 247–60 (see n. 9).
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